In January 2005, an F.B.I. task force was created to deal with MS-13 and Washington announced it would begin to inform Central American states about the criminal records of more deportees. While many local police departments have worked in cooperation with their counterparts in Central America, this move marked a shift toward greater cooperation at the federal level. This shift did not come about simply because of the MS-13 and M-18 operations within and on the border of the U.S.; instead, geopolitical realities helped guide Washington’s hand.
The Greater Turf War in Central America
The U.S.’ signing of C.A.F.T.A. may have helped to solidify El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua’s ties to Washington (as well as Panama as an associate), but the pending agreement remains controversial at best in the region. In order to deflect some of this criticism, the C.A.F.T.A. states may be tempted to align themselves closer to Venezuela and Cuba, the countries at the helm of the growing discontent with Washington in Latin America. Caracas and Havana are making great strides to ensure that there will be no shortage of opportunities for the Central American governments to embrace.
The high price of oil on the global market has allowed Venezuela to move beyond the San Jose Agreement, originally signed in 1980, in which Venezuela and Mexico provide discounted oil to Central American and Caribbean states, in its use of petroleum as a diplomatic tool. Caracas demonstrated the value of this diplomatic chip at the recent Association of Caribbean States meeting, where the C.A.F.T.A. states stood alone in their defense of Washington’s policies in the region. [See: “Intelligence Brief: Caribbean Spheres of Influence”]
In another diplomatic move aimed at securing support from the Central American governments, on August 22 Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Cuban President Fidel Castro handed out diplomas to the first graduating class of the Latin American Medical School funded by Cuba, which Chavez has said he would replicate in his country. Several hundred of the new doctors will return to their Central American homelands to practice medicine. Central American governments are also looking at importing Cuba’s education policies, an initiative that resonates with the public in ways that a free-trade agreement simply cannot. [See: “Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez Makes His Bid for a Bolivarian Revolution”]
Where Caracas and Havana are making inroads in Central America, Washington will move to suture any loss of support by funding popular initiatives designed to strengthen the friendly governments there. One such initiative is likely to be cooperation in tackling the region’s burgeoning gang problem.
In a June meeting of the region’s presidents in Honduras, Guatemalan President Oscar Berger proposed that a regional, “rapid response” force be created to take on the gang problem in Central America. The leaders have embraced the idea of forming a multilateral force to take on the street gangs, but they are of the shared opinion that it could not function without Washington’s involvement.
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fisk, at a press conference following the talks in Honduras, said, “We want to strengthen defense mechanisms, especially in terms of gangs.” However, Washington was slow to involve itself directly in the “rapid response” force, in order to avoid being perceived as funding a military force designed to subdue the Central American population. Still, similar initiatives are likely to be adopted. For example, the U.S. plans to fund a law enforcement academy in El Salvador to train officials from across the region in anti-gang techniques. The weak judicial systems and police forces in Central America are likely to be reinforced by Washington, in exchange for cooperation on intelligence about the gangs’ activities.
The F.B.I. task force created to deal with MS-13 in early 2005 indicates that Washington will focus on law enforcement in its handling of the region’s gang problem, while giving less priority to the social factors that have allowed the gangs to proliferate. The weakness of this approach is that it fails to address the environment that fosters the gang problem. For example, a recent study by the International Organization for Migration claims only five percent of youth gang members in Honduras are linked to organized crime. A comprehensive approach would provide incentives to discourage those youths who identify with the gangs from becoming active members in their criminal networks. However, Washington has not publicly addressed any programs aimed at curbing the gang problem through social initiatives.
Conclusion
The incentives for Washington to initiate an anti-gang program in Central America are clear; however, this has been the case for several years now. One of the main reasons that Washington is beginning to give the problem a greater priority is to prevent Venezuela and Cuba from making inroads into its “near abroad.” This approach may help to strengthen the Washington-friendly governments in Central America, and, unlike free trade agreements, the benefits of such an initiative will be tangible to the local populations. Should Washington take the lead in fighting Central America’s gang problem and fail, it will allow Venezuela and Cuba to gain influence in the region. However, declining to take the lead may only hasten such a power shift.
Republished with the kind permission of the Power and Interest News Report. The PINR is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader.
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