The Hijab in France is the subject of huge controversy. Three Monkeys Online asked Paul Silverstein PhD, and an editor of Middle East Report, about the issues involved with the anti hijab legislation.
What is the likely effect of this ban?
How the ban will be imposed is still up in the air, as
the law does not take effect until the beginning of
the new school year in September 2004. It is likely
that the immediate effect of the law will be a large
number of cases against headscarf-wearing young girls.
These cases, according to the law, will go through a
lengthy mediation procedure (during which
state-appointed mediators will essentially try to
convince the girls to remove their hijabs in the
classroom) before any expulsion procedures are
initiated. Nonetheless, the likely result will be a
number of Muslim students forced to take
correspondance classes from home, or, if their parents
can afford it, enroll in Catholic parochial schools
unaffected by the law. Such cases will receive huge
media attention, and will lead to a number of public
protests and denunciations from throughout the Islamic
world as have already been seen since December. If
the state fails to handle these issues carefully,
already-circulating conspiracy theories about a French
“war on Islam” will gain new adherents, which could
possibly push a number of young immigrants to take
strongly Islamic political positions – the very
situation the state explicitly was trying to prevent
with the law.
A number of proposals were made as part of The Stasi
committee’s report yet only the ban on the hijab was
taken into effect – why?
The ban on the hijab was by far the most publicly
awaited of all the proposals made by the Stasi
committee. Indeed, it was likely the raison d’jtre of
the committee. Others – including the inclusion of
Aid el-Kebir and Yom Kippur as public holidays – are
likely too politically sensitive for the conservative
Chirac government to touch at the moment, specifically
given the recent painful transition to the 35 hour
work week. Other proposals – including the
appointment of Muslim chaplains in prisons,
rehabilitation monies for the public housing projects,
education efforts against racism and anti-Semitism,
and the teaching of non-state languages (like Berber
and Kurdish) – are consonant with already-existing
policies and initiatives and are likely to be
implemented over time. What is surprising, though, is
that these proposals – which could be seen to balance
the hijab ban – were erased from the public
discussion. This, to my mind, was a horrible mistake
by the government.
What role has terrorism in France played in the
introduction of this measure?
As mentioned in the answer to the first question, the
current legislation should be seen as part of France’s
larger “war on terror.” The Stasi commission was
explicit in reasoning that the hijab should be banned
as it was the point of entry for Islamism into the
public schools. The sense was not only that the
schools should be a space protected from society’s
problems, but also that the public school could
possibly become a space for the spread of Islamic
fundamentalism and the breeding ground of terror.
Since the 1995 bombings in the Paris and Lyon,
attributed to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group and in
which several young French-Algerians were accused of
participating, there has been much public attention
payed to a supposed jihad brewing among French Muslim
youth. The legislation — like the larger
militarization of and outlawing of public
congregations in housing projects under law-and-order
Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy – seeks to address
this concern.
You’ve spoken about efforts to “Republicanize” Islam
by the Government – is this possible, and what effect
will this legislation have on those efforts?
The legislation was proceeded by the creation of a
representative council of French Muslims, a body
elected by Muslim citizens that is designed to serve
as the intermediary between the Muslim community and
the French government. The council itself is highly
internally divided, composed of members elected from
three major Muslim associations with political
positions ranging from advocating the secularization
of Islam to the defense of a purist interpretation of
the religion associated with the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood. The president of the body, the
secularist Dalil Boubakeur, was not elected but rather
appointed by Sarkozy. While he has wholeheartedly
supported the legislation, other groups representing
the majority fo the council’s members have been highly
critical if not entirely opposed. Indeed, the
legislation, depending on how it’s implemented,
threatens to fracture the council to the point of
inoperability. To my mind, while secularists will
find in the legislation a space to affirm their
attachment to the “Repubic,” the vast majority of
French Muslims will find themselves further alienated
and potentially attracted by positions that
reciprocally reject the “Republic.”